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Abstract   
A number of recent articles, many appearing in Schizophrenia Bulletin, signal a 
renewed interest in phenomenological approaches to our understanding of 
schizophrenia. These approaches conceptualize schizophrenia as a disorder of 
altered self-awareness and decreased pre-reflective social attunement, which may 
manifest as an impaired understanding of self, others and the physical world. 
Phenomenological approaches to psychopathology are sometimes construed as 
being incompatible with the reductionistic methodology of contemporary 
neuroscience. In this article we re-examine findings from the phenomenological 
investigation of schizophrenia in light of an influential neurocomputational account 
of mindreading, which postulates that understanding-of-others is subserved by 
coherent internal self-models. We argue that the phenomenological approach to 
schizophrenia is not incompatible with a neurocomputational account of 
mindreading, and that the two approaches should instead be viewed as existing in a 
relationship of mutual constraint and enlightenment. Our hypothesis, while 
speculative, is an attempt to marry the phenomenological and neuronal realities of 
schizophrenia. Furthermore, it has implications for psychotherapeutic interventions 
and future research.  
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Introduction  
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in phenomenological exploration 
of mental illness in general,1,2 and schizophrenia in particular.3–7 In parallel, 
researchers have sought to identify points of contact between phenomenological 
and neuroscientific approaches to psychopathology.1,3,8–11 This paper continues in 
that spirit.  
 
First, we present work in the phenomenological tradition that identifies anomalies 
in self-experience and understanding-of-others as the two core experiential deficits 
in schizophrenia.4–6,12–14 We then present an influential neurocomputational account 
of mindreading15,16 as a potential link between these two experiential abnormalities. 
Our proposal is motivated by the recognized requirement to unify 
phenomenological and biological accounts in psychiatry.1,5,17–19  
 
Schizophrenia as a self-disorder  
A phenomenological approach to psychiatry seeks to understand the pervasive 
structural alterations in patients’ subjective experience in an attempt to unify 
otherwise disparate psychopathological features.1,3,20,21 Schizophrenia has been the 
focus of much of this work, with a particular focus on patients’ experience of ‘self’ 
and ‘others’.  
 
The sense of self can be experienced on multiple inter-dependent levels,22–25 from a 
pre-reflective minimal-self,4,5 to a sense of self emerging from ongoing intrapersonal 
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and interpersonal dialogues13 that occupies the center of a personal narrative 
grounded in the social world.26 Abnormalities at each of these levels have been 
proposed in schizophrenia. 
 
Sass and Parnas4 propose that the core psychopathological alteration in 
schizophrenia is an ‘instability of pre-reflective self-awareness’,5 which has been 
termed an ‘ipseity-disorder’ or ‘self-disorder’. They argue that saturating all 
subjective experience is a pre-reflective awareness of self as the unified subject of 
perceptual experience.4 This notion is closely related to the feeling of inhabiting a 
living body embedded in the world.27 Sass and Parnas suggest that the weakening of 
minimal self in schizophrenia has two facets: hyper-reflexivity (an automatic 
tendency to direct objectifying attention towards normally tacit self-experiences) 
and lack of self-affection (a reduced automatic sense of being the unified and vital 
subject of awareness).4,5 These facets are postulated to be the core generative 
features of schizophrenia. A reduced sense of self-affection, for example, may 
manifest in passivity phenomena and a feeling of depersonalization, whilst hyper-
reflexivity may result in bodily sensations taking on a pathologically-salient quality. 
Interestingly, ‘disturbance of the perception of self’ emerged as a core dimension of 
the schizophrenic prodrome in an early qualitative study by Møller and Husby.28 
 
This formulation of schizophrenia as a condition of altered subjectivity and self-
awareness is not new. Kraepelin wrote of a ‘disunity of consciousness’,29 whilst 
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Bleuler wrote of a slackening of the associative links that tie together thoughts, 
perceptions and affects.30,31 Jaspers and Schneider described patients experiencing 
depersonalization who feel ‘estranged from themselves’,23 and for whom ‘Descartes’ 
“cogito ergo sum” … is no longer a valid experience’.23,32 Minkowski wrote of an 
atrophy of Bergsonian intuition and a ‘loss of vital contact with the world’,7,33 whilst 
Laing’s concept of ‘primary ontological insecurity’ resembles ipseity-disorder.34  
 
Alternatively, Paul and John Lysaker argue that a sense of self ‘develops out of 
dialogues both within the individual and between the self and others’, and suggest that 
a ‘disruption in the dialogical self’ is often found in patients with schizophrenia.13,35 
The loss of dialogical ability is likely to disrupt personal narrative formation and 
lead to a subjective sense of personal incoherence.36 Personal narratives have been 
hypothesized to occupy the highest cognitive level in an individual’s predictive 
hierarchy, projecting a sense of predictability, security and order onto a world that 
may otherwise seem chaotic and threatening.26   
 
Dis-sociality, autism and loss of ‘common sense’  
As the minimal self is related to a feeling of immersion in a social world, ipseity 
disturbance is closely linked to a disorder of social functioning.7,27,37,38  
Bleuler postulated that schizophrenia was characterized by an autistic ‘detachment 
from reality’ and the social world.7,30,31 More recently, autism in patients with 
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schizophrenia has been recast as a qualitative disturbance of ‘attunement’ with the 
social environment,7 which Stanghellini & Ballerini term ‘dis-sociality’.14,39 Normally, 
social attunement stems from an automatic participation in a social network of 
shared meanings, and depends on what Blankenburg called ‘common sense’.14,38,40 
For Blankenburg, a loss of common sense was prominent in certain patients with 
schizophrenia, who are “unable to play along with the rules of the game of 
interpersonal behavior.”40  
 
From another perspective, RD Laing postulated that patients with schizophrenia 
exist in a state of primary ontological insecurity, and are liable to view dialectical 
interpersonal interaction as threatening.34 This reasoning has recently been 
explored from the perspective of dialogical difficulties.12  
 
Dis-sociality and lack of social attunement have a number of clinical manifestations. 
Stanghellini talks of ‘deviant’ behaviors as the ‘epiphenomena of the disorders of 
primordial intersubjectivity and common sense’.14 In the case of a young woman, 
Blankenburg wrote that ‘the simplest of things … seem to slip away from her: how to 
behave in certain situations … how to speak with the people one meets, or what one is 
supposed to think about them’.40 More recently, Chris Frith has proposed that the 
thought disorder of schizophrenia is a manifestation of the patient’s inability to keep 
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track of what their interlocutor currently knows, resulting in an inability to 
appropriately signpost their speech.41  
 
In the case where intersubjectivity is seen as threatening, patients may prefer social 
isolation.34 Henriksen and Parnas have described the case of Jane, a young patient 
who found interpersonal contact unbearable, and recalled that even as a child her 
classmates made her feel uneasy as ‘they would come too close.’42 Jane also struggled 
with a feeling of not truly existing in the world, and these complaints preceded 
psychosis. Minkowski describes a patient who had lost the ‘sensitivity’ to 
communicate with others, and viewed ‘any outside force as an attack on his 
personality; if he succumbed to it he would be dragged down and engulfed’.33 
Minkowski’s patient also complained of a feeling of ‘physiological decomposition’, 
‘emptiness in the head’, and a feeling that his voice seemed ‘dead’.   
 
Empirical studies  
Evidence for self-disorder as a specific feature of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders 
has emerged in the last fifteen years,28,43,44 most recently in two heterogeneous 
samples of first-admission patients using the validated Examination of Anomalous 
Self-Experiences (EASE) tool.37,45 Self-disorder appears to show only a weak 
correlation with positive symptom score,37 suggesting that it is a trait or 
vulnerability46 phenotype of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, akin to Bleuler’s 
‘fundamental symptoms’.6,31  
8 of 20  
 
Social functioning and mindreading in schizophrenia has been studied using ‘Theory 
of Mind’ (ToM) paradigms. A large meta-analysis found consistent ToM impairments 
in patients with schizophrenia, both in psychotic and remission phases.47 In a 
subsequent meta-analysis, the same authors found ToM impairments not only in 
first-episode psychosis patients, but also in their non-psychotic relatives and in 
ultra-high-risk patients.48 The magnitude of the impairment in the relatives and 
ultra-high-risk group was intermediate between the psychotic group and control 
group. ToM impairment may therefore represent a trait feature of schizophrenia, 
conferring a vulnerability phenotype.49 ToM impairments in schizophrenia are 
clinically important, correlating with quality of life measures50 and insight.51 They 
may also be accompanied by a sense of loss of immediate social ‘attunement’ and 
feelings of ‘invasiveness’.52  
 
Self-disorder underlies dis-sociality  
Self-understanding and understanding-of-others are clearly interrelated, with a 
number of papers proposing that dis-sociality is secondary to self-disorder in 
schizophrenia.53–55 In this paper we present a neurocomputational hypothesis that 
supports this notion. Computational neuroscience aims to understand the ability of 
neural circuits to extract information about the environment from sensory data, 
where this task is seen as a type of statistical inference. From this perspective, 
understanding the goals and intentions of another person is among the most 
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challenging (statistical) inferential task that neuronal circuits must perform, as any 
number of ‘hidden’ motives could underlie the observable behavior of another 
person.15,16,56 At first glance this account of mindreading could not be further from 
that of phenomenology, in which empathic understanding of others is emphatically 
non-inferential, and often ‘goes beyond’57 the immediate sensory data. It must be 
appreciated, however, that there is no simple isomorphism between the 
descriptions of the ‘same’ phenomena at neuronal and experiential levels of 
analysis. The understanding of another person’s intentions can be non-inferential at 
the level of phenomenological analysis, whilst simultaneously being subserved by 
mechanistic computational processes at the subpersonal neuronal level.9 Indeed, 
this must be the case.  
 
Perception as unconscious inference 
In predictive coding accounts, mindreading is construed as a special case of 
perceptual inference.15,16 In perceptual inference the brain infers the current ‘state 
of the world’ by combining incoming sensory data with prior knowledge gained 
through experience.56,58,59  
 
Neuronal sensory processing circuits are arranged hierarchically.56,58,60 New 
sensory information propagates up neuronal hierarchies, starting at the bottom 
level of sensory epithelia. In parallel, high levels of the processing hierarchy make 
on-line predictions about the expected sensory input given the likely current ‘state 
of the world’ (known as ‘prior probabilities’ or ‘priors’). Prior sensory predictions 
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cascade down the circuit and constrain the interpretation of incoming sensory 
signals, which would otherwise be open to an infinite variety of interpretations.56,61 
At all levels of the hierarchy the (top-down) prior predictions and (bottom-up) 
sensory data are compared, and any discrepancy (‘prediction error’) is used to fine-
tune the current estimate of the ‘state of the world’.56  
 
This iterative process results in an automatic convergence towards an internally-
coherent hierarchical representation of the state of the world that is accurate and 
multi-layered,56 and represents the circuit’s best estimate of the current state of the 
world (the ‘posterior probability’).  
 
Importantly, the top-down generation of sensory predictions relies on the brain’s 
internal ‘generative model’ of the causal structure of the world, which enables 
sensory signals to be predicted from representations of the likely ‘state of the 
world’.56 These generative models are sculpted and optimized in light of experience. 
By suppressing the generative model’s prediction errors the process described 
above achieves a Bayesian inversion of these hard-won generative models. This 
inversion essentially reverses the inputs and outputs of the generative model, 
resulting in a ‘recognition model’ that can identify the ‘states of the world’ given new 
sensory data (i.e. a model capable of perceptual inference).58,59 Mathematical 
treatments of this proposal are outlined elsewhere.58–60 
 
Mindreading and perceptual inference 
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An intriguing suggestion is that the task of inferring the hidden mental states of 
others from observations of their actions uses a special class of internal generative 
models that have been fine-tuned to optimize self-generated motor actions.15,16  
 
These specialized generative models transform self-generated motoric commands, 
themselves hierarchically determined by personal goals and intentions, into 
predicted sensory consequence of the voluntary action. The models may be thought 
of as ‘self-models’ composed of self-organizing hierarchies of personal priorities, 
goals and intentions, which relate to a given social context.16 Kilner, Friston and 
Frith propose that an iterative Bayesian inversion of these generative models, 
occurring at the subpersonal level as described above, would result in recognition 
models capable of grasping another person’s goals and intentions from observations 
of their actions.16 This inversion would allow the neuronal circuit to converge on the 
internally-coherent hierarchical configuration of ‘hidden causes’ that best predicts 
the observed actions of the other person, and is as experientially ‘inferential’ as 
seeing the world when you open your eyes. 
 
What makes mindreading a special case of perceptual inference is that this final 
hierarchical configuration is actually taken from the observer’s own personal 
repertoire of generative models linking an understanding of environmental context 
to self-generated action, through a hierarchy of intentions, priorities and goals 
specific to the observer.15,16 Thus, an accurate prediction of the intentions of another 
person will depend on an intuitive grasp of how intentions, goals and desires are 
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organized within a person, and how they relate to wider environmental and social 
contexts. This understanding is reminiscent of Blankenburg’s ‘common sense’.40  
 
If schizophrenia-spectrum disorders are characterized by instability in the self-
model4 and a reduced ability to form stable dialogical self-representations13 then 
the foundation (generative models) upon which intuitive mindreading is based 
would be disrupted. Consequently, social interactions become less predictable, and 
hence more threatening. In this way mindreading is secondary to the presence of a 
stable and internally coherent self-model that is attuned to the world of social and 
environmental contexts. Interestingly, patients diagnosed with certain personality 
disorders, in which the sense of self is affected, have also been found to have 
impairments in mindreading.53 
 
 
Therapeutic and research implications  
The speculative hypothesis presented in this paper has implications for therapeutic 
approaches and future research. If coherent self-models of goal-directed action 
subserve mindreading abilities, therapies that improve self-awareness and help re-
construct self-narratives in schizophrenia may enhance patients’ experiences of 
living in the social world. Paul Lysaker and colleagues have demonstrated that, in 
the course of individual psychotherapy, increased reflective self-awareness often 
emerges many months before the capacity to form mature relationships with other 
people.35,62–64 Therapeutic approaches that strengthen the patient’s sense of self and 
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improve the coherence of personal life narratives may aid recovery and social 
functioning.12,65–70 
  
Future studies should address how the different facets of altered self-awareness and 
dis-sociality are related within an individual. Furthermore, disorders of social 
functioning and self-awareness occur in psychiatric disorders other than 
schizophrenia, and further work will be required to fully characterize the features 
that are specific to schizophrenia.  
 
Conclusions  
We have presented theoretical and empirical work suggesting that alterations in 
self-awareness and awareness-of-others form the core experiential abnormalities in 
schizophrenia. We proposed a speculative hypothesis connecting these findings to 
an influential neurocomputational account of mindreading, which suggests that 
mindreading is subserved by internal self-models. The hypothesis presented here is 
an example of how phenomenological and neuroscientific approaches to 
psychopathology can coexist in a relationship of mutual enlightenment and 
constraint.21 The phenomenological finding that schizophrenia is characterized by 
disorders of self-awareness and social functioning raises the question of how these 
facets may be related at the neuronal level, whilst a neurocomputational 
formulation positing an asymmetry in the relationship between the core 
experiential deficits has implications for phenomenologically-minded 
psychotherapeutic interventions.  
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The current effort to empirically demonstrate the reality of phenomenological 
abnormalities in schizophrenia and relate them to neuroscientific theories is an 
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